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ABSTRACT 
This is a summary and interpretation of  some of the literature on stock 
price volatility that was stimulated by Leroy and Porter (1981) and Shiller 
(198la).  It appears that neither small sample bias, rational bubbles nor some 
standard models for expected returns adequately explain stock price 
volatility.  This suggests a role for some nonstandard models for expected 
returns.  One possibility is  fads' models in which noise trading by  naive 
investors is important.  At present, however, there is little direct evidence 
that such fads play  a significant role in  stock price determination. 
Kenneth D. West 
Woodrow Wilson School 
Princeton University 
Princeton, NJ 08544 Nearly seven years have  passed since the publication of  the original LeRoy 
and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981a) volatility tests.  The number of  papers 
analyzing or developing volatility tests on  stock prices has now grown to  the 
point that a nonspecialist may have trouble getting an  even general sense of  the 
current state of  the volatility debate.  This paper  is intended to help such a 
nonspecialist, by  summarizing and interpreting the literature. 
Section I summarizes the techniques and conclusions of  some volatility tests 
that assume constant expected returns.  Section II considers whether small sample 
bias is likely to  explain the excess stock price volatility found in  most of  the 
studies summarized in section I.  The presence of near or  actual unit root 
nonstationarity in stock prices certainly causes substantial small sample bias in 
the test in Shiller (l981a), and quite possibly in other studies that assume 
stationarity.  Subsequent studies that explicitly allow for unit roots find 
excess volatility that is typically an order of magnitude smaller than for 
studies that assume stationarity-  -but they do  still tend to find substantial 
excess volatility.  While not much is known on  small sample bias in tests that 
allow for unit roots, it does not seem that such bias explains the persistent 
finding of excess volatility.  Indeed, I present a little evidence that certain 
tests that do  find excess volatility have poor small sample power against 
interesting alternatives. 
The rest of the paper proceeds under the tentative conclusion that stock 
prices are more volatile than can be  explained by a standard constant expected 
return model.  Section III considers explaining the excess volatility by  adding 
to  the usual constant expected return stock price an  explosive rational bubble 
(Blanchard and Watson  (1982), West (1987)).  For a variety of  theoretical and 
empirical reasons, this does not seem to produce a satisfactory explanation. 2 
If  bubbles are ruled out, so  that any deviations  from the constant expected 
return stock price are trensitory, these deviations will give rise to  predictable 
variations in  returns.  Section IV  considers whether stock price volatility is 
adequately explained by  some standard models for expected returns.  The evidence 
here is somewhat limited, but the answer appears to be no  (Campbell and Shiller 
(l987b), West (1988)),  This seems to  be true at least in part because such 
models do not generate sufficient variability in expected returns. 
This suggests that  it might be useful to consider some nonstandard models 
for what determines expected returns.  Section  V  interprets "fads" models as 
arguing that trading by naive investors  creates nondiversifiable  risk that 
sophisticated investors must take  into account (Campbell  and  Kyle  (1986), DeLong 
et  ml.  (1987), Shiller (1984)).  It follows that an appropriate model for 
expected returns will reflect such trading.  The fads literature is,  however, 
rather new, end has yet to  model risk  as precisely as have the traditional models 
discussed in section IV.  There is  little  direct evidence that trading by  naive 
investors plays a substantial role in  stock price determination.  Such evidence 
as there is in favor of fads is largely indirect, and consists of  negative 
verdicts on  traditional present value models.  One would prefer a parametric 
model, so  that the model potentially could be  rejected because of implausible 
parameter estimates  or painfully large test statistics. 
I  conclude that the most important direction for future research on  stock 
price volatility is therefore not still more voleti1ty tests, but development of 
parametric models to  explain the excess volatility that some, including me, 
believe to  be reasonably well established.  My  own sense is that consideration of 
fads is likely to he  productive.  But someone skeptical about fads models could 
reasonably conjecture that any such models will be in as much conflict with the 3 
data as  are traditional present value models, and that refinements of these 
latter models are a  more  promising avenue for research. 
Before turning to a detailed discussion, it is well to  remind the reader 
that this is a  partial evaluation of  volatility tests, in two senses.  First, 
space constraints preclude detailed discussion of  many  relevant issues.  I  give 
relatively short shrift to some  cf the topics covered in detail  in the survey 
papers of  Gilles and LeRoy (1987b), which  focuses  on  potential problems with 
Shiller's (l98la) test, and of  Camerer (1987), which discusses in  detail how 
imperfect aggregation of information can lead to seeming excess volatility of 
stock prices.  Second, as a  participant  in this literature, I am nardly unbiased. 
While  I  have attempted to  represent all points of  view, I have  of course 
emphasized those that I find most compelling. 
I. Overview of Empirical Results 
Table I  summarizes the results of some volatility tests that assume constant 
ex-ante returns.  To  make this task  manageable,  I have  limited myself to 
empirical results that in my  somewhat arbitrary opinion could be  cast in the form 
V/V*, where V measures the volatility of  the market's forecast of  fundamentals, 
V*  the volatility of  the econometrician's measure of fundamentals, and V/V*>l 
indicates excess volatility.  This means that while most of  the papers cited 
below test a number of implications of  the model being studied,  I  will consider 
only those tests that seem  to me to be  similar in spirit to the original LeRoy 
and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981a) comparison of the variance of a stock price 
(V) to that of a certain function of  dividends (V*).  My  sense is that my 
self-imposed restriction probably selects from the studies cited below the IBaS 
rather than  the more  striking evidence: the equality tests in LeRoy and Porter 4 
(1981) and Menkiw et al.  (1985), for example, yield sharper results than dn  the 
inequality tests reported be  low.  Analyses that supply neither new empirical nor 
Monte Carlo estimates (e.g., Marsh and Merton  (1986)) are ignored in this section 
but will be  discussed later. 
To facilitate the distussion below of  whether inapproprete  accounting  fur 
unit root nonstationarity  explains the results of  the volatility tests,  the 
papers  in  Table  7  are grouped according to vhether the test is asympttticslly 
valid only under stetionarity, with  a unit arithmetic root (APt stationary), or 
with  o unit logerithmic root (tlog(P)  stationary).  Listings within each group 
are alpheberitel.  In  Table I,  column (2) gives the sample period.  Most ti the 
studies use Shiller's (l981a) long term  annual data, which splices Cowles 
Commission data beginning in  1871 to more retent  date  from the Standard and 
Poor's  Composite Stork Price Index.  For tonveoiente I will refer to this as 
simply the S  and  F data.  Shiller (l981e) and  West  (1988)  siso use the Shiller's 
mrdified DowJones.  Campbell end Sh.iller  (l987b) also use the New York Stork 
Exchange equal and velue weighted  indices.  With the exception of LeRoy  and 
Porter,  all the studies cited in the Table use annual date,  in parr to avoid 
dealing with sessonelity in dividends.  See the  cited papers for addfticnal 
detail on the date. 
Column  (3) reports the empirical value of V/V*,  calculated for  a given paper 
as  described below  The  pvalua  in column (4)  gives the probebilioy  of seeing 
the column (3) value for V/V*,  under the  null that the model is equation (4) 
below and unit roots, if  any, take the form indicated in  column (5).  For Monte 
Carlo studies, indicated by "Ttsample size"  in column (2), the V/V* value is not 
tha median but instead matches an  estimated empirical value. 
A brief discussion of  the models and tests now follows,  This  may be  skipped S 
by readers familiar with  this literature.  This is intended to suggest the basic 
ideas involved, but not to spell out the precise details.  I will slur over 
inconsequential differences between the models and tests described below and 
those in  the papers cited (e.g., whether current dividends are known when price 
is set).  Some authors have reported asymptotic p-values for test statistics 
other than V/V* (e.g., West (l8) reports the p-value for H0:V*_V￿O,  for V*  and 
V defined below).  In such cases, I have felt free to associate those p-values 
with V/V*, even though the statistic for V/V*  would of  course be  numerically 
different.  Detailed references to  the sources of the entries in  the table may be 
found in the appendix. 
The constant expected return model supposes 
(1)  Pt 
= bE(Pt÷i+DtIIt), 
where  is a real stock price, b a constant discount rate, b1/(l+r), r the 
constant real expected return, E(.jI) is mathematical expectations conditional 
on  the markets period t information set  and  Is the real dividend on  the 
stock.  is assumed to  contain, at a  minimum, current and past P  and 
Dt. 
Substituting recursively for 
'÷1' t+2' etc., and using the law of  iterated 
expectations, gives 
(2)  Pt 
=  + bnpt÷nIIt) 
a  ,njIt 
Suppose that the terminal condition 
(3)  urn 
n-->'. E(b"Pt+ II)  0 
holds  (this rules out rational bubbles, as explained below).  Then  (2) implies 
(4) 6 
where P*  is used  rather than P  to  match Shiller (1981s).  Since Pt is the 
conditional expectation of 
(5)  var(P)/var(P) ￿ 1. 
if the unconditional variances exist.  LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shilier 
(l981a) estimate (5), using different techniques to  calculate the ratio.  Kleidun 
(1986b) and Shillar (1986b) usa Monte Carlo methods to  determine the finite 
sample behaviot of (5)  when log(D) follows a random walk,  and I,,  consists solely 
of lagged dividends,  These studies ara summarized  in lines (2) to  (5) of Table 
I, with  V/V* an estimate of  the left hand  side of  (5). 
The Blanchard and Watson (1982) test, in  line (1), compares variances of 
innovations rather than levels.  Let R  -l' 
...  be  the information set 




E(PtIHt). Than  since more information tends to lead to more 
precise forecasts (West (1988)), 
(6)  { E(Pt- E(P1l1)J2  I E[PtRE(PtHJHtl)}2 
} ￿  1. 
The left hand sida of  (6), which Blanchard and Watson  (1982) calculate assuming 
stationarity of dividends, is raportad as V/Vt  in  line 1. 
Dna of  the  major problems of the initial volatility tests, emphasized in 
particular by  Kleidoo (1986b) and Marsh and Merton (1986), was of  course the 
assumption that variables do  not have  unit roots.  Lines (6) to  (8) of Table I 
suarize some tests that are appropriate if the nonstationarity results from s 
unit arithmetic root.  In  such a case,  the model  (4)  implies that Pt  and  are 
cointegrated (Engle and  Granger (1987)), and Pt_b(lb) tDt  is stationary 7 
(Campbell and Shiller (1987a)).  Basically, a  unit arithmetic root causes a 
linear (but not exponential) stochastic trend in dividends and prices, so 
subtracting  a suitable multiple of  from 
F' 
removes this linear trend in 
Pt 
and 
leaves a stationary random variable.  Mankiw et  al. (1985) show that as a result 
(7)  E[Pb(lb)'Dt]2  /  Pnb(lb)'Dt12 
} ￿  I 
for any finite n, with P  n defined in (2).  The V/V* reported in line 7  results 
when nT-t, T the last period in the sample. 
Campbell and Shiller (1987a) (line (8)) calculate statistics similar to  (6) 
and (7),  expending Ht to include lagged I' and D. West (1988) calculates (6), 
with Ht  defined as in  Blanchard and Watson  (1982) to  consist of just lagged 
dividends, but allows for unit arithmetic  roots. 
Lines (9) to (12) in Table I report studies that have accounted for 
nonstationarity by  allowing for unit logarithmic roots.  Kleidon (l986b) and 
Shiller (1983) both  aasue that 
log(D) 
follows a random walk, with 1  consisting 
of only lagged  dividends.  The model implies that P  is proportional to 
Dt, so 
that 
(8)  ver(P1/P1)  / var(D/D1) 
Kleidon notes that the model (4) also implies that for finite n 
(9)  var(P/P)  / var(P+/Pt)  } ￿  1, 
Estimates of  the ratios in (8) and  (9)  are reported in lines (12) and (10). 
LeRoy  and Parke  (1987) also assume that log(D) follows a random walk  By 
the  logic used to  develop  (5)  above, the model (4) implies 
(10)  var(Pt/Dt) / var(P/D) } ￿  1. Line (11) reports this ratio, calculated assuming that P/Dt follows an  AR(l). 
Campbell and Shillar (l987b)  work  with  a linearized logarithmic version of 
(4),  assuming stationarity of  the log dividend price ratio and log differences of 
dividends and prices.  Line (9) reports estimates of 
(11)  var[log(DJP)l I var({log(D/P)], 
where log[(D/P)] 
is the variance of the log dividend price ratio when  the 
ratio is calculated as a forecast from an  information set Mt  consisting of lagged 
log(ll/P)  and Llog(D) 
The initial tests, in  lines (1), (3) and (4))  of  Table I,  found axtrsme 
excess volatility, with  the variance of  stock prices or thoir innovations 
exceeding a theoretical upper bound by orders of  magnitude.  The statistical 
significance of  the excess volatility was, however unclear.  For example, LeRoy 
and Porter (1981), using the asymptotic distribution, found a violation 
significant at  the five percent level in  only one of  their four data  sets.  As is 
evident from a glance at  the estimates of  V/V* for lines (6) on, allowing for 
unit  roots results in considerably smeller estimates of  excess volatility.  It 
seems that these  initial tests tend  to find spuriously large estimates, at least 
if unit  roots are present. 
For the Shiller (198la) technique for calculating V/V' m 
var(Pt)/var(Ptt), 
reasons for this are developed ti Flavin (1983), Kleidon (1985,198Gb) and Msnkiw 
at al. (1985),  Assume first that  and  are stationary, so that the 
population variances of P  and  exist,  Even  though V/V*  can be estimated consistently, Shiller's (1981a) procedure tends to produce finite sample 
estimates that are spuriously high, with  the bias likely to  be  quite pronounced 
for the relevant sample sizes.  Kleidon (1985, pp2O-2l), for example, reports a 
simulation with  a sample size of 100 in  which the population value of  V/V*  is  .81 
but the mean estimated value s  2.2.  The Marsh and Mertori  (1986)  nonstationary 
example in  which the sample estimate var(Pt)/var(Pt*) is greater than one with 
probability one, for any size sample, might be interpreted as simply a 
nonstationary limiting case of the biases noted by  Flavin (1983) and Kleidon 
(1985) (Mankiw et al. (l985)).l 
While the logic of  Flavin  (1983) and Kleidon (1985) does not apply directly 
to the Blanchard and Watson  (1982) or  LeRoy and Porter (1981) tests, the dramatic 
fall in V/V*  when  unit roots are allowed suggests that similar arguments are 
likely to  be relevant for those tests.  Indeed, the Monte Carlo simulations in 
Mattey and Meese (1986) Indicate that the Blanchard and Watson  (1982) procedure 
will tend  to spuriously find V/V'>1 if unit  roots are present but, as in 
Blanchard and Watson  (1982) (but not West (1988)), are not imposed.  Similarly, 
Gilles and LeRoy (l987b, p64), seem to concede that biases similar to  those in 
Shiller (l981a) are probably present in  LeRoy and Porter (1981). 
This leaves open  the question of  whether these biases are so  large as to 
explain the entire excess of V  over  V*  reported in the various tests in Table I 
Whether they even  totally explain the Shiller (l981a) results is debatable. 
Shiller (l986b) argues that Kleidon's simulation results (line (2)) are very 
sensitive to  the assumed dividend/price ratio.  Kleidon allows a range for this 
ratio of about 1.5 percent (p-value of V/V*  .50)  to  about 4  percent (p-value 
.05).  If  the empirical mean  dividend/price ratio of about 5 percent is used, the 
p-value suggested by  Kleidon's simulation falls to .01 (line (5)). 10 
Wnile another iteration of  the Kisidon-Shiller debate may  well suggest that 
the p-value uf .01  is too low,  it seems to me  unlikely that small sample biases 
will auffioa to  ovatturn the conclusion thet stock prices move more relative tc 
dividends than is consistent with  the model (4),  I  conclude this fur two 
reasons.  First, while there is some conflict among the papers  summarized in 
Table  I,  thara often are dffersnces in assumptions and approach that suggest why 
come  tests find excess volatiity  while others do  not.  Thesa differences usually 
sear  to me to  argue for the plausibltty  of tha tests that find excess 
volatility.  Specifically, the "1" and "0" entries in  rows (t) and (7)) tand to 
result when  axpactad returns of less than 4 percent are assumed.  Expected 
returns closer to the actual sample mean  of about 8 percent result in  the larger, 
and statistically more significant, figures in these rows.  More importantly, as 
documantad below, the K1sdon (line (10)) and LeRoy and Parke (lna (11))  tests, 
which stand out from the other entries in  the Table fot finding little or no 
axocas volatility, appear to have poor power against a Shiller (1984) "feds' 
alternative (see Gillas and LeRoy (1987b,p45)).  Sinoa i.t  is just such an 
alternativa that has bean  proposed as an axplanaton  of  the results of other 
volatility tests (Shillar (1984)), the Klaidon (line (10)) and LeRoy and Parka 
(line (11)) results are not persuasive avidanos that the results of other tests 
are misleading. 
The saoond reason I think it unlikely that small sample bIases will  overturn 
the finding of  excess volatility is that the other tests in  Table I that allow 
for unit roots do  tend to find violations of  the relevant varanoa bounds.  While 
thasa violations typically are  an  order of magntuda smaller  than those  of  the 
initial tests, they still  ara numerically large.  Since these tests directly 
allow the (near or actual) nonstationarity that probably Is central  to  the small 11 
sample problems with  the pepers in panel A, there does not seem  to  me to be a 
reason to suppose any particular bias.  In fact,  while there is of  course some 
small sample bias in these tests (Mattey and Meese (1986), West (1986,1988)), the 
evidence on  this does not suggest that such bias explains the excess volatility 
that those tests tend to  find.  See the entries for West (1988) in  Table  I. 
The rest of this section citains a small study of  the power of the Kleidon 
(line (10)) and LeRoy and Parke (line (11)) tests against a Shiller (1984)  'fads" 
alternative, or, more generally, any alternative that generates slowly decaying 
deviations of  stock prices from  the constant expected return price determined by 
(4).  Suppose that 
(l2)(a)  log(D)  i + log(D_1) + 
(b)  log(P)  t +  1og(D)  + 
(c)  a  a1 
+ 
— N(0,  ,,2), v 
— N(Q,  02), Ev  0 all t,s. 
Equation (12a) says that dividends follow a logarithmic random walk, as in 
Kleidon (1986b) and LeRoy and Parke (1987).  Equations  (l2b) and (12c) say that 
the mean  log price-dividend ratio t is perturbed by  the stationary AR(l) random 
variable  The Kleidon (1986b) setup is a special case of (12) with a 
a 0. 
In the spirit of  O'Brien (1984), Shiller (1984) and Summers (1986), one can 
interpret a  as a "fad" that drives the stock price away from the value that 
2  would result If the data were generated by a  model consisting of  (4) and (12a). 
The S and P data (1871-1985) were used to  calculate point estimates of  the 
parameters in  (12).  The numbers at the foot of  Table II result when  j  and 
were set to  the mean  and  sample variance of log(D), r to  the sample mean  of 12 
log(P)log(D),  2  a var(aJ to the sample variance of log(P_)-log(DJ,  to the 
sample estimate of  cov(a4./a l)/02 and o 
a (l2)o.  There are several ways to 
emphasize that with  these parameter estimates, the date generated by  (12) are 
rather  different  from those generated by  a model with  oonstaot expected returns 
sod a lognormsl random walk  divideod process.  First, a shock to at that pushes 
iog(P)-log(D) from its mean has a half life of  nearly foor years (4  =  = 
.48).  In the seose auggested by  Summers (i986), this can he  argood to  be a 
sigoiticant devistioo from the constant dvtdeo&prtce  ratio pcedicted by 
Kletdoos (l986b) model.  Second, more than half (57 percent, to he  exact) of  thu 
implied variance of Alog(P) is due to  shocks to  a4.  rather than to log(D,J. 
Third, the implied standard deviation of  the ooe period expected return 
E[(Pt1+D)/PJIti  is quite substantial, about ,05. (The implied uocooditooal 
mean, return is about 1.08).  For any or all of  these reesoos, one would hope that 
a  volatility test would distinguish between data generated by (12)  oo  the one 
hand  and (4)  and (12a) oo  the other. 
Consider first the LeRoy aod  Parke test.  Computing var(P/D)/ver(P/DJ 
requires estimates of just four momeots: the meao  expost return, the variance of 
P5/Dt ard the mean  cod verisoce of Ot/Ot. (LeRoy and Perke (1987)).  But with 
the paraneters listed at the  bottom of Table  II, date  generated  by  (12)  will 
imply essentially the  V/V*  computed by the LeRoy and Parke  (1987) test, sioce 
such  date imply essentially these four sample moments,  See Table II, panel A.  A 
finding of V/V*  <I using the LeRoy and Parke (1987) test therefore does not in 
di.stingush the  model  (4) from the alteroative (12), 
Eveluatioo of the power of the Rleidoo (l986b) test seems to  require a Monte 
Carlo experiment.  The simulation generated 1000 samples of size 115,  with the 
presample values of  log(P,) and log(D) matched to  those of the S and P  date  in 13 
1871,  and the presample value of 
at 
drawn from its unconditional distribution 
(with a different draw  for each simulation).  P  was generated recursively,  as in 
Kleidon (1986b).  The sample estimates of var(P+/P) and var(P+ /P) were 
calculated in the usual way.  As  stated in  Table I, panel B,  the estimates of 
var(Pt+n/Pt)/var(P+n/Pt) 
m  V/V*  were less than one for n1,2, more for n=5, 10. 
The question is whether the small values for n1  and 2 are comforting evidence 
concerning a model consisting of  (4) and (12a).  The answer appears to  be  no.  In 
the Monte Carlo simulations for n=l, for example, only  6 of  the 1000 samples 
produced a V/V  greater than  1.  It appears, then that Kleidon's  (1986b) test, 
5  like LeRoy and Parke a (1987), has poor power against this alternative. 
I certainly do not consider this a  definitive statement on  the power of  the 
various tests in  Table  I, and fully agree with  LeRoy and Parke (1987) that 
additional study of the power of  volatility tests is of  great interest  Nor do  I 
consider the question of small sample bias completely resolved.  Nonetheless, for 
the reasons summarized above, it seems unlikely to me  that small sample bias 
provides the bulk  of the explanation for the excess volatility  reported in Table 
III.  Rational Bubbles 
Stochastic difference equations such  as (1) have a  multiplicity of 
solutions.  The solution (4) is unique provided that the terminal condition (3) 
holds.  But if  not, there are an infinity of  solutions 
(13)  Pt  E(bi+bDt+,!It) 
+ Ct 
a  + C. 
C  is any variable that satisfies E(CtIIt l  b'Ctl 
a (l+r)Ci,  i.e., C 14 
(l+r)Cti 
+ V,  E(VtjIt1) 
= C.  C 
is by  definition a rational bubble, an 
othen4ise extraneous event that effects stock prices because everyone expects  it 
to do sc.7  Since the solution (13)  satisfies the first order condition (1), 
expected returns are constant and there are no arbitrage possibilities. 
(Rational bubbles are possible with time varying expected returns,  See Flood and 
Rodrick (1987).  i use a constant expected return model for simplicity.)  The 
'f" superscript on F  is present because P  depends only  on  fundamentals, 
Slanchard and Watson (1982) note that it is possible to  have bubbles that 
grow  and pop  The folluwing example of a strictly positive bubble  is from West 
(1987) 
(C  _C*)/mb  with probability ir 
(14)  =  t1 
with probability (1a) 
C<m<l, C>O. 
The bubble bursts with  probability 1-m,  and has an  expected duration of (l1T) 
While the bubble floats it grows at rate (biO5 = (l+r)/m  > l+r:  investors 
receive an  extraordinary return to compensate them for the capital  loss  that 
would have occurred had the bubble burst.  Whether or  not the bubble bursts can 
depend on  fundamentals (e.g., ml/2, with  the bubble bursting if there  is had 
news about budget deficits),  A1ternatvely,  whether the bubble bursts or  not can 
depend on  extraneous "sunspots."  It is possible to have a composite bubble, 
consisting of  a linear combination of  bubbles like (14),  with  each (14) bubble 
having its own  iT  end Ca.  Also, 'a  can vary over time  (West (1987)). 
Rational bubbles therefore seem consistent with  the recent (1987) pattern of 
extraordinary stock price increases followed by a dramatic collapse.  Rational 
bubbles also seem  a  potential rationalization of  excess volatility teats.  Even 15 
if  the bubble is uncorrelated with  fundamentals, stock prices move more than the 
model (4) predicts; if this correlation is positive, so that the market 
overreacts to news about fundamentals (Shiller (1984), DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985)), excessive stock price movements are even easier to rationalize. 
Moreover, this can be  done with  small or  even no  variations in  ex-ante returns. 
The rational bubble explanation was one that I favored in  West  (1987) and in the 
initial version of West (1988) (which, in fact, was initially titled 'Speculative 
Bubbles and Stock Price Volatility').  I no longer find this interpretation 
particularly appealing.  I  will explain this by  first reviewing the theoretical 
literature on  bubbles, and then discussing some empirical results. 
One immediate theoretical restriction on  rational bubbles is that they 
cannot be  negative.  If C<O  and  the stock price is lower than its fundamental, 
the possibility of  an extraordinary capital gain when the bubble bursts must  be 
compensated  for by  a potential capital loss if the bubble continues to float 
downward.  Since stock prices must be  nonnegative, there will be, for any bubble 
process, a low enough stock price that precludes any further capital loss.  Since 
such a stock price is inconsistent with  a bubble, so,  too, is any higher stock 
price than can lead to such  a low stock price.  8y a  backwards recursion, there 
cannot be a negative bubble on a stock, because any such bubble  leads to an 
infeasible price with  nonzero probability. 
Are positive bubbles similarly inconsistent with  rationality?  In models 
where agents have infinite horizons, the answer appears to be  yes (Tirole 
(l982)).8  Any agent who sells a stock at a  price higher than its fundamental can 
exit the market, leaving negative present value for whomever buys it.  Bubbles 
are ruled out when  agents have infinite horizons even  if traders have 
differential information and if short sales are prohibited (Tirole (1982)). 16 
Positive bubbles are not,  however, ruled out in models with  finite horizon 
agents.  Tirole  (1985) stodes this in  a nonstochastic, perfect foresight, 
overlapping generations model.  Each generation will be willing ro  pay more than 
fundamental value for an asset, provided the succeading generation is similarly 
willing,  It is necessary that the hubble not inflate the stock price so fast 
that stock market wealth ends up  exceeding GNP (to take so  extreoe example). 
Otherwise, a backwards recursion will rule out bubbles.  In Tirole's (1985) 
model, this means that  the  rate of g:uwth  of the  economy must he greater than the 
return on the stock.  In such  a case,  the steady state per capita hobble may he 
positive. 
While I am not aware of a stochastic cars  iOO of Tirola'  s modal, intuition 
suggests (to me, at least) that such a generalization can be  accomplished.  Some 
unpleasant issues would, however, have  to be  handled.  Oibe  and Grossman (1987) 
note that if there ever is a bubble, ft  would  have to be  present from the first 
day of  trading: E(OttI, )  =  (l±r)O. 
and C  nonnegative means that if 
then cO  with  probability one:  Merton (1985) notes that there must be acme 
mechanism to limit managerial issues of  new stock, 
More fundamentally, one must ask how reasonable is Tirole's necessary 
oondt  ion thst  the mean growth rate of the economy be  greeter than the mean 
return on the stock price (assuming, again,  that titis  is  a necessary cooditon in 
a stochastic version of Trole's model).9  The  mean  annual  real axpost return on 
S  and P data  187 14986 is about 8  percent;  the mean  growth  rate of real  GNP  i5 
about 3  percentJ°  In the case of  a  burating bobble such  as  iO  (14), moreover, 
the  relevant comparison is probably between one plus  the growth rate and (1+r)/m 
> l+r  rather than l+r:  one  presumably must insure zero probability that the stock 
price exceeds the value of  national output.  While  taxes and so forth muddy the 17 
issue, the excess of  the mean  ex post  return on aggregate stock price indices 
over  the mean growth rate of  the U.S. economy does not suggest that Tiroles 
necessary condition will  apply.  See Abel et al,  (1986). 
Is the seeming excess volatility of  stock prices nonetheless strongy 
suggestive of rational bubbles?  There are several reasons why the answer seems 
to  me to be  no.  First, Flood an  I Hodrick (1986) argue that at  least certa n 
stock market tests, including Mankiw et al.  (1985), implicitly aliow  rbh ce 
under the null.  Some tests for finite maturity bonds also fird some sidence 
excess volatility  (e.g., Singleton (1980)), which,  if true, cannot be due to 
bubbles: there cannot be  a bubble on  the final date when  the bond  -res and 
therefore by a  backwards recursion there cannot be a  bubble at  any  'ar er  sate. 
One would  like to have a common explanation for the excess volati..  tj that  seems 
to be found in  these various tests applied to  various assets.  te.ond  as 
discussed in West (1987), while my  tests are perfectly capable of 
something that looks roughly like a  bubble, they  are probably not abe  to 
discriminate between a  bubble and "noise" that is almost but not tucte a buoble: 
E(CJIi)  (say) .99 instead of •(l+r) a 1.08.  '"bird, bubbies 
suggest that stock prices should grow at  a rapid rate.  If dividends grow note 
slowly than the rate of return (an assumption implicitly made  when E(IbO+.) 
was assumed to  be well defined in (13)), the dividend/price ratio should fall and 
capital gains should take an  increasingly large share of  ax-post returns,  But 
for the S and P data, 1871-1986, this does not seem to be  the case.  The mean 
ex-post return in  the first half of  the sample, 1872-1928, is 8.6 percent  with  a 
mean dividend price ratio of .053;  in  the second half of  the sample cbs figures 
12 
are 8.3 percent and .051. 
In sum, theory for rational bubbles  is still at a  preliminary stage.  But 18 
the theory  so  far developed  suggests conditions  for  bubbles  that are too 
stringent to rake bubbles  particularly attractive:  the growth  rate of the  econoay 
rust  be  greeter then the  return on the stock;  eny asset with  o  bubble rust  b±ave 
always  had  a posittve bubble;  factors other than hobbles  rust explain  any excess 
volatility on  finitely lived assets, and perhaps sore of  the excess volatility  on 
stock prices as well.  In addition,  the evidentc  for explosive bubbles cc  West 
(1987)  is at best suggestve  and consistent as well with  deviations from 
fundsrencals being borderline stetionary. 
A netursl  candidate to  explain  any excess price volatility is roveaents in 
expected returns.  Ynis was of  course emong the explanetions proposed in  soma  of 
the  first published comments on volatlty  tests (Long (1981)). and has been 
argued more  recently by Flood at al,  (1986).  Indeed, the model (4), end 
therefore the variance huunde that folloss from it;  neqcire only the terminal 
condition (3)  end a constant expected return.  So if,  in population, there is 
excess volatility, and bubbles are ruled out, with  deviations from the constant 
expected return stock price fundamental being transitory, ft follows that 
mathematically expected returns are varying.  Sea Campbell end Shiller (1987o) 
end Flood at al.  (1986) for interpretetuna  of  volatility tests as especially 
powerful tests of  the null  of constant expected returns. 
A general form fur a model with time  varying expected returns is 
(15)  Pt 
= E[  c0(flo  ÷r++;)D+j 
where  i5 the one period return expected by  the market in  period  t+i 
(e.g., r+1 
m 
E[(Pt÷1+D_)/P1Iti).  What sorts of  movements in expected returns 19 
must he occurring to  explain the resoita in Table I? 
First of alt,  these movements apparently must Os large  Using  ,ineerize 
version  -f (15), but modelling expected returns nonparsnerrroaliy, Soi.er 
'l9Sle) finds  that annual rest expected returns would na-s to hao  e randaro 
deviation of more then 4 percent.  West  1988' and Ontarbe end  S  rsm?rc  195"). 
also using  ineaoized mooels, but allowog for unit roots, ro'c1ie  Uer cnn 
larger ooiemena :n oxpected returns crc ,eossr  z  '-'  at tc,c1ls  -t  U  pr  i's 
rovemanrs,  These arthors seem  to consrfer  riis tot Cr  on4e  then  pios 
considered reCsjnetle, 
Seoond, two votati'  it; tests that dow  for rios vs ytng  Cxpe-e4 r'ta-'c,  d' 
nor sugges. 'out the excess ;oist'ir7 to  Cab's  I  is s-leo  stey  •xpaet;d '  soa 
standard  'cterremporal  models  Foe erect, ilemphe''  cod Sh'tler  f  .-: a 
linearIzed vereton of l5,  to coepure (11),  allowing for than—  i' cCerrr "oda;s 
for expected returns  tne retorn on short debt plus a cunstao: the 000s..optro: 
based esset pricing model 'L.cee '1978, wttu  coratant re1st'v 'tsk avertor, 
= n, the return on  ,hort dent  p us s tern that deperdr "n toe - 
variances of stock rnt'arns.  The information set used to oe'oolete  -oost.on 
(lU's varVlog(D/P 1H  consists of lagged log(J /P). dlogtJ) and Jagged 
ax-post returns 
A second study, West  (1983), uses l5) with expected raturns detaroinad by 
the consumption based asset priring model, with constant relative risk avsralon 
and a coefficient of  relative risk aversion less then two  This model implies a 
condition like (6),  with  P  end D  replaced by  Pt 
m and  a 
DtCt 
m  and 
t'  9t-l' 
' 
The results  of the two studies ara raported In  Table  III.  Neither  finns 
that the assumed model of  expected returns adequately rationalizes stock price 20 
movements.  Campbell and Shiller (l987c) further find little theoretically 
plausible connection between stock prices and their measures of  expected returns, 
and suggest (p35) that the smaller and less significant estimates of  V/V* are 
found in specifications that seem to  pick up certain spurious correlations.  It 
should be  noted that both  papers allow for unit roots, so that there is no 
obvious reason to  believe that small sample bias explains the excess volatility. 
Now,  one could argue about the accuracy of the linearizations used, or  about 
the validity of  the models of expected returns assumed in  the parametric tests in 
Table III, or  about how well official consumption data capture the utility flows 
really necessary to  test the consumption based asset pricing model.  There are 
many  nontrivial problems associated with  the tests just described.  But the 
evidence to date does not suggest that traditional models of return determinetioo 
successfully explain the seeming excess volatility of  stock prices, even in 
ronjunction with small sample bias. 
flds 
The tentative conclusion that neither rationsl bubbles nor traditional 
models of  return determination can explain stock price volatility suggests that a 
nontraditional model for return determination might be  required.  In "fads" 
interpretations of  the volatility tests, noise trading by  naive investors plays a 
significant  role in  stock price determination.  Shiller (1984) and DeBondt and 
Thaler  (1985) argue that psychologicsl and sociological evidence is consistent 
with  indiv±dusls following "Irrational" trading rules, overreacting to news. 
Poteotslly,  this both generates wide variations  in expected returns and renders 
inadequate traditional models for return determination. 
-One  simple way to  think through the possible sffects of fads is to  add a 21 
factor die to  noise trsding to the level or log of  whet would he  the fundementel 
price if expected returns were constent (Campbell and Kyle (1986), Poterba and 
Summers (1987), O'Brien (1984), Shiller (1984)),  Equation (12) is a simple 
example of  this (though to capture investor overreactoo  one might want tIe 
innovation in s  tO  be positively correlated wIth  che innovation in :og(C)). 
Recall  thet the equation (12) example, with peremeters matched to the S and P 
estimates, does indeed generete side  swin4s in expected returns,  with  c standard 
deviation of  shout  .95,  Also, one could of course capture the 1987 runup and 
then collapse of  stoce prices by allowing a stationary versIon of the explosive 
bubble  (14).  For example, of e 
= U/ir)e1 
.  + v  with  prubecility n, a 
= 
v0 
with  procahllity l-n,, O<,o<I, E(vJ15 ,) = 9,  then E(a'c1) 
=  and s 
is steiiunary.  As in the Sleoch&rd end Wenson  (1912; explosive bubble, investor 
overreaction  is reflected if,  say, vl/2 end the fad "bursts" f  thre is bad 
news  about fundamentals. 
In one  irterprecetiuc,  feds mean  thet even after rise adJusteents  mere era 
profitable  .ppnrtcnities, at  least for smart investors with song enough horizons. 
This  apparently  is the conclusion of some readers of Sh11er (981a) (e.g., 
Atklay  (1983,. 
Another interpretation i5 that while some fractun of tredng is done cy 
naive  traders, another fraotton of  trading is done by sophstioated  fnvestnrs who 
insure that there are no  extraordinary expected returns once risk is properly 
actounted for (Campbell and Kyle (1986), DaLong at ci.  (1987)).  This does not 
mean  that stock prices are driven to  whatever level they would be in  the absence 
of fads.  RIsk  is created by  naIve investors, whIch suphlstltsted investors must 
take into account.  Such  risk  might not, however, be  captured by  traditional 
models. See especially Dethng at al.  (1987), whlth tontains a highly stylized 22 
model in which nondiversifiable  risk created by  noise trading causes the prices 
of  two seemingly identical assets to diverge.14 
There is of  course much  anecdotal evidence of fads,  including the famous 
beauty contest passage in Keynes (1964).  Nore  formal evidence consistent with 
stories of  investor overreaction may  be found in DeBondt and Thaler  (1985, 1987) 
and Lehmann  (1987).  These papers find that abnormally high  returns can be earned 
by following a contrarian strategy of  buying stocks that recently have had 
relatively poor returns, shorting stocks that recently have  performed well'5 
See DeLong at  al.  (1987) and Camerer (1987) for additional examples. 
At a more aggregativa level, a growing number of  studies suggest that there 
is a significant stationary component to  stock prices (Lo and  McKinley (1987), 
Fame and French (1988), Poterba and Summers (1987)).  This component (a in 
equation (12)) is associated with econometric predictability of  stock returna, 
using variables such as lagged  dividend-price ratios or earn1ngs  The 
predictability is particularly marked  at  long horizons, say, over two years 
(Campbell and Shiller (1987c), Fama  and French  (1987,  1988), Flood at  al. 
(1986)). 
Poterba and Summars (1987) and Shillar (1984) interpret this as evidence of 
slowly mean  reverting fads.  But the only  unambiguous interpretation of  evidence 
that stock prices do  not follow a random walk is that expected returns are time 
varying.  Whether or  not the studies just cited imply movements in expected 
returns that can best be  explained by  fads is debatable (Fama and French (1987)); 
one can trivially define a  n  equation (12)  as  simply the log of the ratio of 
the stock price (15), with returns determined by some standard modal, to a 
constant expected return price.  So  evidence of a stationary component  is at best 
suggestive of fads.  This applies as well  to  Campbell and Kyle  (1986), a fully 23 
articulated empirical study that allows for fads.  It estimates an  explicit model 
of  tradiog by  sophisticated Investors, when a residual ooise process affects 
stock prices.  It finds that the noise process accounts for over one fourth of 
stock price movements in  the S and P data, 1871-1984, but does not present any 
evidence that this process results mainly from trading by naive investors. 
Traditional present value models (e.g., those discusaad in  section IV  are 
well enough specified tnat one can potentially  argue that theae aodela cannot 
adequately explain stock price volatility.  I  do  not believe that the same can be 
said for  fads  models that have bean developed  so  far.  The  quantItative ev:dence 
in  favor of fads aa an  explanation of stock price volatility a largely indirect, 
in  the form of  negative veidicta on  bi1bb  Lea  and on tradItional models for 
returns. 
Mora  direct evidence on fads,  and tests of restrictions Implied  by fads,  may 
wall ha  forthcoming shortly.  But at  present there is littla formal positiv 
evidence to sway someone unsympathetic to  fads models 24 
Footnotes 
1.  See Gilles and LeRoy (1987b) for an excellent exposition. 
2. As  emphasized in  section V below, other interpretations are possible,  To 
prevent misunderstanding, I should note  thet I am  not proposing to  take (12) as a 
serious model of  stock prices, or even  as an  adequete cherscterization of  the a 
and P data: Table 4a in  Campbell and Shiller (l987b) indicates that the 
assumption that tlog(D1) and log(Pj-log(D,3  are independent is false.  I am 
merely using (12)  to  get a quick idea of  whether the LeRoy and Parke (1987) and 
Kleidnn (1986b) tests have power against the alternetive that there are slow 
moving divergences of stock prices from a constant expected return fundamental 
value, 
3.  Sketch of algebra:  Let  consist of  past s  and v.  Since P1/P  and Ct/P1 
are lognormal, and a1 and log(P)-log(D) 
are independent, it is straightforward 
to  show  that E{i+Dt)/PtlIt] 
=  exp[+(Ø-l)at+.5(o2+o2)j'+ expft-ai.  Tha 
axpectad return is thus the sum  of  two lognormal random verables, and one can 
grind through standard formulas to compute its vsriance. 
4. My  estimate of  V/V* is considerably higher than thet of  LeRoy and Parke 
(1987), even though data  are quite similar,  This is basically because the LeRoy 
and Parke method of  calculating var(Pt*/Dt) 
is very  sensitive to  the estimated 
value of  the following: (mean expected return)1 x (meen value of  Dt+i/Dt).  They 
compute this to  he .9548,  I  get .9427.  Were  I to  use the .9548 figure, V/V* 
would fall from .63 to .38,  much closer to  LeRoy and Parke's estimate of .29. 
5.  My  estimates of  V/V* are ootably bigger than Kleidon's (l986b) for n5, 10. 
Two minor  reasons are choice of discount rate  (I use the inverse of  the mean 
ax-post return,  Kleidon tries various imposed values) and sample period.  The 
ma3or reason is that Kleidon calculates var(P÷/P)  and var(Pt÷/P)  by taking 25 
the som of squared deviations not around the respective sample means but, for 
both, around en  estimate of E(P/P).  If  I had mimicked his procedure the 
Table II value of  V/V* for n10, for example would be 1.80 rather then 4.18. 
Because the sample means of P1/P e  are rather different,  Kleidon'  s 
technique sharply raises the estimate of 
ver(P+lO/P) end thus sharply lowers 
the estimate of  V/Vt.  Although Kleidons technique is eppropriate uoder ois 
null, it clearly results in substenciel bias under the present alternative. 
6. 1 shousd note that the Marsh and Merton .i986l dividend smoothing argument 
seems to me to be one of smell sample ties lr.djoen by Ineppropriete treatment of 
rnt roots, as suggested stove.  Marsh ant Metton (1986, p485), however, seem to 
suggest cast e desire of  osoegere to  smooth dividends by itself iovalidetes 
volatility compsrisor.s.  This is not correct.  A ksy to  the validity of  the 
variance 'ounds methodoiogy  is e stable set of decision rules by  market 
psrtw:ipants, and a anape large enough for the data to  accurately ref  leot the 
functioolng of thosp nIce  See Kleidon (1985,1986b).  Note  tnat if this key 
conditIon is not, any icatistical inference on the joint dynemios of the dividend 
process,  including tnst in Marsh end  .Merton  (1987), is not valio.  See Shiller 
(198lb)  on the related issue of  biases that might result when  market participants 
anticipate events that never occurred. 
7.  It shoald be emphasized  that throughout the paper, the term "bubble" refers to 
the explosive process C.  By  contrast, many  authors (e.g., Ackley  (1983); use 
bubbles to  refer to any deviation from  fundamentals induced by speculation. 
8. But see Gilles and LeRoy (1987e), which  apparently concludes that bubbles car 
in principle exist in such models. 
9. See Abel at al. (1986) for a discussion of  condftions that rule out bubbles in 
a stochastic environment. 26 
10.  1 computed this using the figures for GNP in 1875-1985 in Gordon (1987), for 
GNP in  1986 in the October  1987  issue of  the Federal Reserve Bsnk of  St.  Louis's 
fliflQnQiGILQa. 
11.  The  Mankiw  et  al.  (1985) test is,  however, likely to unreliable in the 
presence of  bubbles, even though these are allowed under the null.  Confidence 
intervals will be  large: in the presence of  bubbles, the variance of  the Mankiw 
et  al.  (1985) estimates is blowing up,  for exactly the reasons the variance blows 
up in  the presence of  a logarithmic random walk  (Merton (1985)). 
12.  As usual, there is also potentially a peso problem, where  anticipations of  s 
never-realized shift in the dividend process can look like a bubble that grows 
and pops.  See Flood and Hodrick (1987), Obstfeld and Rogoff  (1986), and Smith 
(1987). 
13.  Unlike Shiller (1981a), however, neither West (1988) nor Poterba and Summers 
(1987) give any evidence on  the accurscy of  their linearizations.  West's  (1988) 
in particular is unlikely to be  very reasonable in  the presence of unit  roots, 
14.  It should be  noted that in this interpretation of  fads, many of  the 
traditional tools of  financial analysis are still applicable, with  the presence 
of  nciae trading an  additional constraint facing rational investors.  It 
therefore seems extreme to  conclude (Kleidon (l986a), Merton  (1985)) that we can 
allow for fads only  by iioring much  of our accumulated knowledge about finencisi 
marketa.  See Shiller (1986a). 
15.  Whether these seeming pricing anomalies reflect not idiosyncratic rak  but 
miameaaured nondiveraifiabli  riak is,  however, unclear. APPENDIX 
This gives  detailed  sources  for Tables  I and III.  Notation  matches  that 
in the cited paper, 
Table  I:  L.g,Jfl:  Blanchard  and Watson  (1982,  pl8),  V/V'  ratio of V  to 
Line (2): Kleidon  (1986b,p983),  Table  2, case (Ii); p-value computed 
from 'No,  of  Gross  Violations'  column.  a_L:  Leroy  and Porter 
(l9Bl,p572),  Table  III, V/V'  (0)/*(0);  p-value  is that  associated  with 
f°  Line (4):  Shiller (l98la,p43l),  Table  2,  V/V*  square  of ratio  of line 
(5) to line (6).  jLj:  Shiller (l986b,p7),  jable  1,  case C; p-value 
computed  from column  (2), L:  Cempbeil  and Shiller  (l987a, plo78), 
Table 3,  panel  B,  V/V*  = var(SL)/var(SL')  and var()/ver('). 
0.2  Mankiw  et a!.  (9BS,pp68S,BB8),  Tables  I and II,  V/V*  ratio of E(P-P  to 
E(P**P0)2  Line (8k. West (1988), Table II,  VIV*  = [1  -  (  Di  x 
for differenced  specifications,  with p-value  in  coi,  (7); Monte  Carlo  results 
are from  Tables  lilA  and IIIB  ifl:  Campbell  and Shiller  (1987b,p40), 
Table  4b, V/V*=a(&t)/o(5fl2, with  p-value  for 
H0: 
=  1. 
ujQI:  Sleidon  (l986b,p986),  Table 3,  V/V*  square  of  "Standaro  and Poor's 
Ratio" nolumn;  p-value  computed  from  "Number  of  Simulation Violations>l" 
column.  Line (11).  Leroy and  Parka (l987,p22), V/V = square  of reported 
ratio of standard deviations.  LjJj2J,: Shiller (l983,p237). 
Thl&.,,ll:  Line (1):  Constant  premium:  Campbell  and Shiller (l987b,p4l), 
Table  5,  V/Vt =  with p-value for H0: o(5')/ø(  1. 
Consumption  and return volatIlity' V/V*  = [c')/)i2,  with p-value for 
H0: c(5')/a(S) 
= 1;  these figures are not  reported in  the paper but were 
given to  me  by John Campbell.  Line ffl: Wast(l988),  Table  IVA,  V/V"  = [I - 
(01 x percentage  excess  variability)}' for m￿2. REFERENCES 
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Volatility  Tests, Constant  Expected Return 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Author  1  nQil 
A.  Asymptotically  valid  under  stationerity: 
(i)  Blanchard  and  Watson  annual,  1871-1979  72  .00  no 
(1982) 
(2)  Kleidon (198th)  N100  25  .05-10  logarithmic 
(3)  Leroy and  Porter  (1980)  quarterly,  1955-73  16-148  .01-50  no 
(4)  SMller (1981a)  annual, 1871-1979,  31—176  na.  no 
1928-1979 
(3)  Shiller (1986b)  T100  25  .00-01  logarithmic 
8.  Asymptctically  valid  with  unit arithmetic  roots: 
(6)  Campbell  and Shiller  annual, 1871-1985  1-67  .00-  .50  arithmetic 
(l987a) 
(7)  .Mankiw  at  (1985)  annual, 1871-1984  0-12  n.e.  arithmetic 
(8)  West (1988)  annuel, 1871-1980,  5-10  .00-01  arithmetic 
1929-1979 
T100  5  .05  arithmetic 
T100  5  .05  logarithmic 
C, Asymptotically valid with unit  logarithmic roots: 
(9)  Campbell and Shiller  annual, 1871-1986,  2-14  .00  logarithmic 
(1987b)  1926-1986 
(10)  Eleidon (1986b)  annual, 1926-1979  0—1  .50  logarithmic 
(11)  Leroy  and Parke  (1987)  annual, 1871-1983  0  n.e.  logarithmic 
(12)  Shiller (1983)  annual,  1871-1979  2  .01  logarithmic 
Notes: 
1.  A column (2) antry  of "Tsample size"  indicates a  Monte  Carlo  study rather than an 
empirical point  estimate. 
2.  In  column  (3),  entries were  rounded down to zero if V/V*<l but  otherwise were rounded to 
the nearest  integer.  See the text for how V/V* is calculated  for a given entry. 
3.  Entries in  column  (4) were rounded as follows:  .00  zeans  that the reported p-value is 
less than .005;  .01,  between  J0S  and .01;  .05, between  .01 and .05;  .10,  between  .05 and 
.10;  .50,  greater than  .10. Table  II 
Power Against Mean Reverting Fad 
A  leroy and Parre  1987) 
Estimate  from S and P  Estimate  ImplIed by  Alternative 
7/V*  .63  63 
9, Sleidon  (1986b7 
o  Estimate of  'l/V* from  Monte Carlo  Estimates 
S and P  Median  Prob V/7*>1 
.34  .40  006 
2  .69  '7  .303 
1  .66  1.43  .781 
10  4.6  1 90  .920 
The a' :errati,s data generattog  process  15 (12,, wtth: s  012, 0  1211, t=3.C, 8.83 
o = 1347,  'Ps tnousand samples were  drawn  to generee the Monte Carlo  esttmstes In panel 8. 
ANditicoal  deraIls are  to the text. 
Table in 
VolatilIty  Tests, Varying Expected Return 
/  (2)  '3;  (4, 
1Li  p-value  S4aotai 
(1;  Canpbel,  and EiIe,r  annual, 1889-1988,  2-8  .00  constant p"emtan 
1926-1986 
1-8  .00-50  consumption 
2-12  .00- 50  return volarIl;ry 
(2)  West (l987h)  annual,  1889-1978  5-30  ma.  consumptIon 
Notes' 
1.  See  notes  to Table  1. 
2.  As explained in  the text,  in colut (5), "constant  premium" means expected  stock  returns 
have a constant  premium  ovar  chat  on short debt;  "consumption"  means  expected stock returns 
are  determined  by the consumprioo baseo asset pricing  model; "return volatIlity"  means 
expected  stock returns  have s premium  over  that on  short debt,  with the premium  depeodeo  on 
tha volstilty of stock returns, 